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Abstract 
This paper utilizes a policy change to estimate the effect of teacher density on 
student performance. We find that an increase in teacher  density has a positive 
effect on student achievement. The baseline estimate – obtained by using the 
grade point average as the outcome variable – implies that resource increases 
corresponding to the class-size reduction in the STAR-experiment (i.e., 
a  reduction of 7 students) improves performance by 2.6  percentile ranks 
(or 0.08 standard deviations). When we use test score data for men, potentially 
a more objective measure of student performance, the effect of resources 
appears to be twice the size of the baseline estimate. 
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2  IFAU – Resources and student achievement – evidence from a Swedish policy reform 1 Introduction 
One of the most controversial (and important) issues in the economics of edu-
cation is whether additional resources are beneficial for scholastic achievement. 
The disagreement is so profound that not even the quantitative reviews of the 
literature are in agreement. Some reviews (e.g., Hedges, et al. 1994 and 
Krueger, 2003) find positive impacts of smaller classes on student outcomes, 
while others (most prominently, Hanushek, 1997) find no beneficial effects of 
smaller classes. 
This paper revisits the question of whether student outcomes are improved 
by an increase in the amount of resources invested in schools. The evidence 
that we offer comes from a policy change that affected the allocation of resour-
ces over schools. In the beginning of the 1990s, authority over schools was 
decentralized to the local level. Prior to this reform, school resources had been 
determined by a system with ear-marked money granted from the central 
government. After the reform, the central government distributed a block grant 
and the local authority could decide on the allocation of spending over its vari-
ous responsibilities (including schooling). This reform induced a clear change 
in the allocation of resources over localities and we utilize this change to esti-
mate the causal effect of resources on student performance. 
The previous literature on the relationship between school resources and 
student achievement is very extensive. Space prevents us from giving a repre-
sentative overview of the literature; useful summaries of the literature are 
available in Krueger (2003) and Hanushek (1997). Let us just mention here that 
studies using some kind of experimental variation – be it actual or quasi – tend 
to find positive effects to a greater extent than studies relying on observational 
data. 
The bulk of the evidence which is experimental in nature pertains to the US. 
Analysis of the Tennessee STAR experiment (e.g., Krueger, 1999) suggests 
that the effect on test scores of a class size reduction by seven students was on 
the order of 0.2 standard deviations. 
Studies of the link between resources and schooling outcomes using Euro-
pean data along with a credible identification strategy are much less common. 
In the Swedish context, Lindahl (2005) represents the only serious attempt to 
examine the issue. He used a sample of 556 5
th graders in Stockholm and found 
that the achievement gains in response to class size reductions by seven 
IFAU – Resources and student achievement – evidence from a Swedish policy reform  3 students are comparable to STAR. His preferred set of estimates corresponds to 
gains ranging from 0.10 to 0.24 standard deviations. 
In contrast to Lindahl (2005), our analysis is based on data which are repre-
sentative for the entire population of compulsory school students in Sweden. 
We use the decentralization reform to calculate difference-in-differences esti-
mates of the effect of teacher density (i.e. the number of teachers per student) 
on student outcomes.
1 Our identification strategy is thus akin to the one applied 
by, e.g., Duflo (2001). 
This paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 provides a background by 
documenting the evolution of resources over the 1990s and early 2000s and 
describing the institutional changes that were implemented in the early 1990s. 
Section 3 examines whether the distribution of resources changed after 
decentralization. In Section 4 we investigate whether resource changes has a 
causal effect on student achievement. We look at the average effect, but we 
also pay particular attention to pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
Section  5 concludes. Throughout this paper we focus on the compulsory 
schools (i.e. schooling at the primary and lower secondary level). Our principal 
measure of resources is the number of teachers per student. 
2  Resources and institutional change 
The 1990s was a very eventful decade for Swedish youth education. Among 
other things, this decade saw a substantial decline in education expenditures 
relative to GDP. Expenditure per student in compulsory schools, as a share of 
GDP per capita, declined from 34 percent in 1991 to 24 percent in 1999; see 
OECD (1994, 2002). These developments took place during a time period 
when the typical OECD country experienced no major changes in resources. In 
2002, Sweden spends about as much on primary education relative to GDP per 
capita as the average OECD country. 
Part of the decrease in resources should certainly be attributed to the severe 
economic slump that hit Sweden in the beginning of the 1990s. But there were 
also other changes: in the beginning of the 1990s, authority over schools was 
decentralized to the local level. Formally this change took place in 1991. But it 
                                                      
1 Note that we will use “the teacher/student ratio” and “teacher density” interchangeably through-
out the paper. 
4  IFAU – Resources and student achievement – evidence from a Swedish policy reform was not until 1993 that the local authority could decide on the allocation of 
spending over its various responsibilities. Between 1991 and 1993 the system 
with ear-marked money granted from the central government was still running, 
albeit in a less strict form. 
2.1 Institutional  change 
Prior to decentralization – i.e. prior to 1991/92 – the allocation of resources 
was determined through a strict system with ear-marked money.
2 The central 
government – via the regional schooling authorities (länsskolnämnderna) – 
more or less determined the amount of  resources at the school level. For 
instance, the number of teachers at the school level was effectively determined 
by a central government grant. The municipalities had little freedom to allocate 
expenditure on different items within, e.g., the compulsory schooling system. 
This was changed in 1991/92. The municipalities still received a grant for, 
e.g., compulsory schools from the central government. However, the munici-
palities could freely allocate the money across schools and various items within 
the compulsory schooling system. Thus, the system is still one of ear-marked 
money but it contained more degrees of freedom for the municipalities. The 
reform was implemented such that the real amount of resources for each 
municipality was the same as in the old system. 
The new system survived only one additional year, however. As of 1 Janu-
ary 1993, the money, previously ear-marked for education, was incorporated 
into an overall equalization grant (a block grant). Unlike the previous reform, 
the (real value of the) equalization grant in 1993 was lower than the sum of the 
components in 1992; see Johansson (2003). From this year and onwards, the 
municipalities can freely allocate resources over its different responsibilities. 
Arguably, this is the big change in terms of the allocation of school resources 
over municipalities. 
2.2  School inputs during the 1990s and early 2000s 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the median teacher/student ratio (i.e. the num-
ber of teachers per student) in compulsory schools during the school years 
1990/91—2002/03.
3 These numbers are calculated as the median over munici-
                                                      
2 Du Rietz et al. (1987) contains an excellent description of the resource allocation system prior 
to decentralization. 
3 To calculate these numbers we use the teacher register, a register of all individuals employed in 
Swedish schools; section 4.1describes these data more fully. 
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Figure 1 Median teacher/student ratios, percent, 1990/91—2002/03 
Source: Calculations using the Teacher register. 
Notes: The figure shows the population weighted median over municipalities. Certified teachers 
refer to those with a degree from teacher education. During 1990/91—1997/98 the number of 
teachers have been converted to full time equivalents using 25.3 stipulated teaching hours per 
week as the measure of full-time teaching load. For later years there is a (reliable) measure of 
employment intensity directly available in the data. In doing these calculations, we have imposed 
the restriction that individuals holding more than one position can work no more than 120 % of 
full time. 
 
The 1990s saw a continuous decrease in the teacher/student ratio (solid line). 
From 1990/91 to 1999/00 the median teacher/student ratio decreased by 
1.7 percentage points – from 9.1 to 7.4 percent. The decline during the 1990s is 
driven by the fact that the number of teachers has not kept pace with the in-
crease in the student population. Between 1990/91 and 1999/00 teacher density 
declined by 0.4 percentage points holding the student population fixed at the 
1990 value. 
6  IFAU – Resources and student achievement – evidence from a Swedish policy reform There is evidence suggesting that the monetary incentives for becoming a 
teacher declined substantially between the late 1960s and early 2000s.
4 The 
evidence further suggests that this development contributed to a decline in the 
demand for teacher education, implying that the supply of certified teachers has 
been stagnant for some time and that there has been a decline in the academic 
performance of those opting for teaching (Björklund et al, 2005; Fredriksson 
and Öckert, 2007).
5  Figure 1 shows that when the teacher/student ratio in-
creased, starting in 1998/99, this was primarily accomplished through the 
hiring of non-certified teachers (i.e. teachers without pedagogical training). By 
2002/03 almost 19 percent of teachers did not hold a certification. The density 
of certified teachers has declined rather dramatically, from 8.6 percent in 
1990/91 to 6.2 percent in 2002/03. The most likely culprit for the sharp in-
crease in the number of non-certified teachers is that the municipalities were 
constrained by the supply of certified teachers. The recent work by Andersson 
and Waldenström (2007) lends support to this hypothesis. They show that 
increases in the resources made available for compulsory schools imply a 
greater decrease in the fraction of non-certified teachers if unemployment 
among certified teachers is high. 
There is thus some evidence suggesting that the skill composition of teach-
ers has changed over time. The only available indicator reflecting such a 
change is whether teachers are certified or not. We will therefore present evi-
dence where we hold the change in the share of non-certified teachers constant. 
We note already at this stage that our results do not depend on whether we hold 
the share of non-certified teachers constant or not. 
The literature on the effect of resources on outcomes is generally about class 
size. It is somewhat unfortunate, therefore, that there is no recent information 
on average class sizes available. The most recent information dates back to the 
beginning of the 1990s. In 1991/92, the average class consisted of 
                                                      
4 There was a reform to teacher wage determination in 1996. Prior to 1996, teacher wages were 
governed by “wage-scales” determined in central negotiations. After 1996, teacher wages have 
been determined locally. Fredriksson and Öckert (2007) show that the post-reform distribution of 
teacher wages is remarkably compressed, despite de-regulation; further, the return to teacher 
education seems to have been unaffected by de-regulation.   
5 For instance, Björklund et al (2005) examine how the share opting for teacher education has 
varied across birth cohorts. Among those born in 1948, around 30 % of university graduates had 
a teaching degree; for those born in 1972 the corresponding share had declined to around 20 %, 
suggesting that the relative demand for teacher education declined over time. Across the same 
two cohorts, the relative performance at ability tests conducted at age 13 declined for those who 
subsequently got a teaching degree. 
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shown in Figure 1 into changes in class size. The numbers shown in Figure 1 
implies that the number of students per teacher increased by 18  percent 
between 1991/92 to 1999/00. Thus, multiplying 21.8 with 1.18 gives a 
predicted class size of 25.8 students, i.e., an increase of four students per class. 













Figure 2 Percentile ratios of the teacher/student distribution, 1990/91—2002/03 
Source: Calculations using the Teacher register.  
Notes: These numbers have been obtained by first calculating the population-weighted percen-
tiles over municipalities and then forming the percentile ratios. 
 
Now let us look at the distribution of resources over students. Figure 2 shows 
percentile ratios of the distribution of the teacher/student ratio over munici-
palities. The solid line shows the 90/10 ratio, while the dotted lines “decom-
pose” this ratio into 90/50 ratio and the 50/10 ratio. The spread of the distri-
bution stood at a low in 1993/94. Since then there is an upward trend in the 
90/10 ratio. The widening of the distribution appears to have taken place 
mainly at the bottom of the distribution. The 90/50 ratio is largely constant 
throughout the period; but there is an upward trend in the 50/10 ratio. Thus, the 
evolution of the distribution of resources over students during the 1990s has 
primarily been to the disadvantage of students at the lower end of the resource 
distribution. 
8  IFAU – Resources and student achievement – evidence from a Swedish policy reform 3  Did decentralization change the 
allocation of resources? 
In Figure 2 there appears to be an increase in the spread of the distribution of 
resources over students during the 1990s. But it is not a priori clear whether 
this increase should be attributed to the institutional reforms. In this section we 
present some evidence suggesting that the reform drastically changed the allo-
cation of resources over municipalities. To do this we look at mobility in the 
overall distribution of resources. Since the decentralization reform implied that 
the rule for allocating expenditure over municipalities changed, we would 
expect that the ranking of individual municipalities with respect to inputs in-
vested in schools should have changed. Figure 3 examines whether this was the 
case. 
Figure 3 reports the rank correlation in teacher densities over time. The 
solid line shows the correlation with the rank in the preceding year (e.g., the 
entry for 1991 shows the correlation between 1991/92 and 1990/91). The 
dashed lines show the correlation with the rank three or six years prior to the 
year in question (e.g., 1991/92 with 1988/89 or 1985/86). 
There is clear evidence that the reform shifted municipalities around in the 
distribution of resources in 1993. The first solid line shows the correlation be-
tween adjacent years. It is evident that the correlation is markedly lower for 
years involving 1993, i.e., 1992/93 and 1993/94. This is illustrated even more 
sharply by the dashed lines in the figure; the correlations are substantially 
lower for years that come from different resource allocation systems. This is 
particularly evident for the rank correlation between years that are six years 
apart; prior to the reform the correlations hover around 0.70–0.75 while after 
the reform the correlations hover around 0.45–0.50. The six year correlation 
picks up in 1998/99 which involves years from the same resource allocation 
system (i.e. 1998/96 and 1992/93). Overall, it seems that the stability of the re-
source distribution is lower in the new system; this is perhaps what one should 
expect given that the state of the municipal budget has become more important 
for the determination of schooling expenditures. 
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Figure 3 The rank correlation in the current and lagged teacher/student ratio, 
1986-2001 
Source: Unpublished statistics, Statistics Sweden. 
Notes: The solid line shows the correlation with the closest preceding year. The entry for, e.g., 
1991 thus shows the correlation between the ranks in 1991/92 and the ranks in 1990/91. The 
dashed lines show the correlations with the rank lagged three or six years. The data have kindly 
been supplied by Inge Göransson at Statistics Sweden. 
 
In this analysis we have not taken into account that some of the change in the 
distribution of resources may be due to changes in the characteristics of 
students. Now, the characteristics of students change slowly over time so it is 
highly unlikely that they will account for the sudden shift in Figure 3. This 
conjecture is substantiated by the analysis in Björklund et al. (2005). 
In short, there is clear evidence of a shift in the allocation of resources over 
municipalities.
6 The timing of the shift suggests that the most likely culprit for 
                                                      
6 This can also be substantiated by some formal analysis. We have decomposed the changes in 
teacher density over the entire time period relevant for our subsequent empirical analysis 
(1991/92—2000/01) into two year changes in teacher density (1991/92—1993/94,   
1993/94—1995/96, etc.). It turns out that the changes over the entire time period are highly 
correlated with the initial changes during 1991/92—1993/94 (the correlation is 0.53) but not so 
much with the changes over the other sub-periods. This suggests that the reform caused a one-off 
change in the allocation of resources.  
10  IFAU – Resources and student achievement – evidence from a Swedish policy reform explaining it is the change in funding responsibilities, where the system was 
changed from one where the central government provided ear-marked money 
for schools to one where the municipalities received block-grants which was 
intended to finance all their responsibilities (e.g. schools, elderly care, and 
social assistance). 
4  Resources and achievement: the 
evidence 
It is notoriously difficult to estimate the causal effect of resources on student 
performance. The difficulties stem from compensatory behavior on the part of 
educational authorities. Credible evidence presumably requires some kind of 
experimental – either explicit or quasi – variation. In this section we make use 
of a variation that is potentially exogenous: the change in schooling expen-
diture induced by the decentralization reform. We thus ask the question: Did 
the change in schooling inputs induced by the reform have an effect on student 
performance? 
Although the reform clearly represents an exogenous shift in the distribution 
of resources over municipalities, it is not evident that the induced resource 
change is exogenous to student achievement. A particular source of concern is 
that resource changes are correlated with the unobserved determinants of 
changes in student performance. To deal with this concern we also control for 
the trend in student achievement. 
4.1  Data and descriptive analysis 
The data we use come from population registers maintained by Statistics Swe-
den. There are two main sources of data: (i) the register of final grades from 
compulsory school; (ii) the teacher register. The first register contains grade 
information for individuals graduating from compulsory school (compulsory 
school is 9 years and individuals normally graduate at age 16). These data have 
been matched with different registers using the unique identity number. Thus 
we obtain information on gender, age, immigrant status from the population 
registers and also information on key parental characteristics such as educa-
tional attainment and immigrant background. From these data we extract two 
cross-sections of individuals finishing compulsory school: those who com-
pleted compulsory school in 1992 and 2001. Those who graduated in 1992 are 
IFAU – Resources and student achievement – evidence from a Swedish policy reform  11 unaffected by the decentralization reform (implemented on January 1
st 1993) 
and those who graduated in 2001 have spent their entire compulsory school 
careers in the decentralized system. In between these two time-points there is 
also a reform of the grading system. To make these two different grading sys-
tems comparable, we attach a percentile rank to the grade point average 
(GPA).
7 
The teacher register is essentially a register of all individuals employed in 
Swedish schools. This register records, inter alia, where the individual is em-
ployed, if he or she holds a teaching position, whether the individual is certified 
to be a teacher or not, and the working-time. From this information we calcu-
late the number of teachers (measured in full-time equivalents) per munici-
pality at different time points. 
In the subsequent analysis we also use some auxiliary data. First, we collect 
information on municipality characteristics that we know are important for 
predicting resources in the old resource allocation system, i.e. the one prevail-
ing before the reform. These characteristics include municipal income and 
basic characteristics about the pupil population such as the fraction of foreign-
born and the fraction of students with university educated parents. Second, we 
exploit data from the military enlistment tests. The virtue of the test score data 
is that they provide more objective measures of student performance than 
grades. The drawback, of course, is that they pertain to men only. 
Table A1 presents some descriptive statistics. It shows, for instance, that the 
share of foreign-born students increased by two percentage points in between 
the two time points, and that parental education rose rather substantially. 
Our basic strategy is to calculate difference-in-differences estimates of the in-
duced resource changed due to the reform. Table 1 illustrates the logic of this 
estimator.  
                                                      
7 To provide some feeling for the units involved we performed the following calculation. We 
took all students who participated in the PISA study from 2003 and lived in an EU15 country or 
the US and then ranked the math scores of these students. Along this metric, a percentile rank 
can be translated into 2.4 score points on the PISA math test. An average student from the EU15 
scored 506 on the math test, while the average US student obtained a score of 482 (the PISA 
scores are normalized to 500); 2.4 score points thus corresponds to a tenth of the EU15-US gap 
in math performance. 




  Reduction in ln(teacher density) 1991-2000        
  1/3 biggest  1/3 smallest Difference        
  Panel A: ln(teacher density) 
Year 2000/01  1.983 2.053  -0.071 
  (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) 
Year 1991/92  2.258 2.159 0.098 
  (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) 
Difference  -0.275 -0.106 -0.169 
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010) 
  Panel B: Ninth grade GPA (percentile ranks) 
Year 2000/01  48.203 51.230 -3.027 
  (0.467) (1.017) (1.119) 
Year 1991/92  49.209 50.800 -1.591 
  (0.317) (0.695) (0.764) 
Difference  -1.006 0.430  -1.436 
 (0.519)  (0.517)  (0.731) 
  Wald estimate of teacher density on GPA 
   8.495   
   (4.163)   
Notes: Ninth grade GPA is in percentile ranks. The municipalities are grouped based on their 
reduction in ln(teacher density) 1991-2000. The observations are weighted with the average 
number of compulsory school completers in the municipality in 1991 and 2000. Standard errors 
adjusted for clustering (municipality) are in parentheses.   
 
For purposes of illustration, we divide the municipalities into three groups on 
the basis of their reductions in teacher density between the 1991/92 and 
2000/01 school years. In the first column we show data for the municipalities 
with the greatest reductions in the teacher/pupil ratio (1/3 biggest). On average, 
teacher density fell by 28 log points – or 24 percent – in this group (see 
Panel A); concomitantly student performance was reduced by one percentile 
rank (see Panel B). The second column shows data for the group of 
municipalities with the smallest reduction in the teacher/pupil ratio 
(1/3  smallest). In this group, teacher density was reduced by 11 log points 
(10 percent), while performance was improved by 0.4 percentile ranks. There 
was thus a greater reduction in student performance in municipalities which 
saw a greater decrease in teacher density. If we calculate the ratio of the two 
IFAU – Resources and student achievement – evidence from a Swedish policy reform  13 changes (-1.4 percentile ranks divided by -0.17 log points) we obtain the Wald 
estimate of teacher density on the GPA. As shown by the bottom panel, the 
Wald estimate of increasing teacher density by 100 log points (72 percent) is to 
improve student performance by 8.5 percentile ranks. Thus, taken seriously, 
student achievement is improving in the number of teachers per student. In the 
remainder of the paper we investigate whether this result holds up to more 
formal regression analysis. 
4.2  Baseline regression estimates 
In principle one should think of the entire resource development during com-
pulsory school as being important for student performance towards the end of 















jt d d y y




− −  (1) 
 
where y denotes mean student performance in municipality j, d (the log of) 
teacher density, t ( 0 t ) post- (pre-) reform observations, and g grade levels. For 
simplicity we have suppressed all observed covariates and taken a difference to 
eliminate a municipality fixed effect. Now, we do not observe teacher density 
by grade. Rather we observe average teacher density in all grades at time t ( 0). 
The question is what an estimate on this variable captures in our differences-
in-differences set-up. Under what condition(s) is the estimate interpretable, 
given equation (1)? 
t
By manipulating equation (1) a little bit, one can establish that the key 
assumption – if equation (1) is the true model – is that the change in average 
teacher density over grades is a reasonable approximation of the change in 
teacher density by grade. This assumption does not have to be literally true – if 
there are random deviations from this requirement we estimate the effect of re-
sources on student achievement with attenuation bias. In other words, if the 
change in resources is roughly uniform by grade, our estimate is biased towards 
zero. It is not key, however, that  k g− = β β  because the estimate is still inter-
pretable as the effect of resources averaged over grades  ) ( k g E − = β β . But, 
given reasonable priors about how the effect varies over grades our estimate is 
presumably lower than the effect of class-size variations in, say, grades 1 to 3 
on student achievement in third grade. 
14  IFAU – Resources and student achievement – evidence from a Swedish policy reform Another specification issue concerns whether teacher density should be intro-
duced in levels or logs. We do not have strong priors on this but have chosen to 
enter this variable in logs.
8 The choice between levels or logs proves to be un-
important as the results are very similar if we enter teacher density in levels.
9 
Table 2 presents a set of baseline regression results. The dependent variable 
is the percentile ranked grade point average.
10 As we move along the columns 
we increase the level of sophistication of the specification. In column 1 we 
report the results of a simplistic OLS equation. We find no correlation between 
resources and student performance. This estimate is of course misleading for a 
number of reasons. Therefore we move on to the second column, which shows 
the bare-bones difference-in-differences estimate (DD) which is akin to the 
Wald-estimate reported in Table 1. This estimate is slightly higher than the 
Wald-estimate; it is also more precise since we use the entire range of the 
changes in the teacher/pupil ratio to identify the effect. 
Column 3 reports our preferred baseline estimate. On top of the munici-
pality and time fixed effects, we standardize for gender, age, whether the indi-
vidual is a first or second generation immigrant, whether (s)he immigrated 
during the five years directly preceding graduation, and the educational attain-
ment of the parents. The regressions also include the (log. of) average munici-
pal income, the average size of schools in the municipality, the size of the 
student population, as well as the averages of the individual characteristics. The 
principal motivation for including the municipality variables is that they cap-
ture characteristics which were important for determining the allocation of 
resources in the system with ear-marked money for schools. The coefficient on 
teacher density is thus identified by the deviation from the prior resource allo-
cation rule induced by the reform. Notice also that we hold the number of 
                                                      
8 This implies that we are assuming that the effect of a class-size reduction from say 30 to 20 is 
the same as the effect of a reduction from 15 to 10. Entering teacher density in levels would 
imply that we are assuming that the effect of a class-size reduction from 30 to 20 is the same as a 
reduction from 20 to 10. It is not a priori clear which is the most reasonable specification. 
9 For instance, a specification corresponding to column 3 in Table 2 suggests that a 10 percentage 
point increase in teacher density improves student performance by 7.4 percentile ranks (this esti-
mate has a t-ratio of 2.2).  
10 In 1992, Math and English were taught at two levels (advanced and basic). The subject grade 
across levels is not comparable. By 2001, this had changed and there was only one level in Math 
and English. Our measure of the GPA in 1992 does not take the variation in levels across 
students into account. This is not ideal, but proves to be unimportant for the results. We have also 
performed the analysis excluding Math and English from the calculation of the GPA. The results 
are very similar. 
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students constant, implying that the identifying variation comes from the varia-
tion in the number of teachers, which is a variable that local school authorities 
has some direct influence over. 
The preferred baseline estimate thus suggests that the conclusion from 
Table 1 holds up to more detailed analysis. An increase in the teacher/pupil
ratio improves student achievement. The inclusion of observed characteristics 
reduces the impact by 2 percentile ranks but the coefficient remains statistically 
significant. 
The remaining three columns show that the baseline estimate is robust to 
some conceivable alternatives. Columns (4) illustrates that it does not matter if 
we hold the share of non-certified teachers constant.
11 And the final two 
columns show that the estimate reported in column 3 is robust to more flexible 
specifications. Importantly, the point estimate in column 3 is not changed by 
introducing, inter alia, a control for the previous trend in performance; see 
column 6.
12 This suggests that the results are not driven by resource changes 
being correlated with the unobserved determinants of changes in student per-
formance. All that happens when we add more flexibility is that the precision 
of the estimate is reduced somewhat. 
 
 
11 We choose not to include the share of non-certified teachers in our baseline specification since 
we do not have an instrument that separately identifies the variation in certified as well as non-
certified teachers. The share of non-certified teachers is measured as ln(1+(# non-certified teach-
ers)/(# certified teachers)). The reason for using this measure, rather than the share of non-
certified teachers as such, is that this is what an exact decomposition of the log of the teacer/pupil 
ratio produces; moreover, if the # non-certified teachers is small relative to the # certified teach-
ers this approximately equals the share of non-certified teachers. 
12 Ideally, we would have liked to include the previous trend measured in terms of the GPA. 
However, this is not possible since grades are unavailable before 1988. The test score trends have 
been estimated separately by municipality using data for individuals who graduated from 9th 
grade between 1981 and 1990. In estimating the test score trend we did not control for the char-
acteristics of the individuals, since such data were unavailable to us for the time period in ques-
tion. We think the omission of individual characteristics is unimportant as the characteristics do 
not change much within municipality over time.  Table 2 OLS and DD estimates of teacher density on ninth grade GPA  y g    
Model  OLS DD DD DD DD DD          
ln(teacher  density)  -0.45 9.04 6.91 7.00 7.15 6.89 
  (1.62) (3.43) (3.04) (3.06) (3.16) (3.24) 
Control  variables:        
Municipality  fixed  effects    X X X X X 
Reform fixed effect     X  X  X  X  X 
Individual  variables      X X X X 
Municipality  variables      X X X X 
Share  of  non-certified  teachers     X    
Individual  variables×reform       X  X 
Municipality  variables×reform      X  X 
Test  score  trend×reform       X 
n  200,871 200,871 200,871 200,871 200,871 200,871 
Notes: The regressions are based on pooled individual data on ninth grade GPA in 1991/92 and 2000/01. GPA is in percentile ranks. The individual 
variables are: gender, age at compulsory school completion and its square, whether the individual was foreign born, whether the individual 
immigrated within the last five years, whether both parents are foreign born, whether there is at least one parent with high school education, and 
whether there is at least one parent with a college education. The municipality variables are: the fraction of females, the average age at compulsory 
school completion, the fraction of foreign-born, the fraction who have immigrated in the preceding five years, the fraction with two foreign-born 
parents, the fraction of students with at least one high-school educated parent, the fraction of students with at least one college educated parent, the 
log of the average income in the municipality, the log of average school size, the log of the number of pupils in the municipality, and the log of the 
(geographical) size of the area. The test score trend is the linear time trend coefficient from separate municipality regressions of military enrollment 
test scores for men who completed compulsory school in 1981-90. The observations are weighted with the average number of compulsory school 
completers in the municipality in 1991 and 2000. Standard errors adjusted for clustering (municipality) are in parantheses.   
 Let us translate the estimate in column 3 to a tangible impact estimate. During 
the period of observation, median teacher density fell from 8.8 (1991/92) to 
7.5 percent (2000/01) which corresponds to a decline by 16 log points. The 
evolution of resources over the 1990s thus contributed to a decline of student 
performance by 1.1 percentile rank, or 0.03 standard deviations (SD). This may 
not appear much when compared to the estimates in Krueger (1999) or Angrist 
and Lavy (1999). But it should be remembered that the class-size reduction in 
STAR – the most well-known experiment in this field – is much greater than 
the variation available in the Swedish data. 
So let us instead try to link the estimates to the class-size reduction in 
STAR. The average class size in 1991/92 was around 22 students and the 
median teacher/student ratio stood at 8.8 percent. Suppose that class size is 
reduced by seven students, roughly the magnitude in STAR. This corresponds 
to an increase of teacher density by 4.1 percentage points (around 38 log. 
points).
13 Evaluated at this point, the estimates suggest that the effect of reduc-
ing class size by seven students is a gain in achievement of 2.6 percentile ranks 
(0.08 SD). 
In sum, the estimates reported in Table 2 imply that class-size reductions 
have a smaller impact in the Swedish than in the US context. Further, the esti-
mates are smaller than the ones reported by Lindahl (2005) for Sweden. Of 
course, there are numerous potential reasons for the difference in results. Rela-
tive to the US context, the variation in student performance and student socio-
economic background is lower in Sweden than in the US. Further, Krueger 
(1999) looks at students who are younger than the ones we consider here. The 
age of the students is likely to be an important factor; for instance, the model in 
Lazear (2001) suggests that class-size reductions should have a bigger impact 
for younger students. Finally, Krueger (1999) has access to test score infor-
mation, rather than information on grade points averages, which proves to be of 
some importance as we will now illustrate. 
                                                      
13 We obtain this number by first inverting teacher density to get the student/teacher ratio. We 
then multiply the student teacher ratio by 15/22 to obtain the student/teacher ratio implied by a 
class-size reduction of 7 students. We, finally, invert the student/teacher ratio to get the teacher 
density implied by a class-size of 15 students. In doing this calculation one should remember that 
we are almost outside the range of the data. There were only two municipalities in 1991/92, and 
none in 2000/01, that had a teacher density of the implied magnitude. 
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4.3  Some additional results 
Here we raise two additional questions: Does the impact of resource changes 
differ across the distribution of family background characteristics? And are the 
results robust to using test scores rather than grades? 
Table 3 addresses the first question: Are students with different back-
grounds differentially affected by resource variations? The results reported in 
the table are based on the baseline specification corresponding to column (3) in 
Table 2. 
Columns (1) and (2) report separate estimates by gender. The impact for 
females (8.7 percentile ranks) tends to be greater than for boys (5.2 percentile 
ranks), but the estimates are not statistically different from one another. Col-
umns (3) and (4) report separate estimates by parental education. “Academic 
parents” refer to children who have at least one parent with a university degree; 
“non-academic parents” refer to the remainder of the population. The estimate 
for children from non-academic backgrounds is larger in size, but in the statis-
tical sense there are no differences across the distribution of parental education. 
Columns (5) and (6), finally, report separate estimates by immigrant status. The 
estimates are virtually identical across the two groups, but the separate estimate 
for immigrants is not statistically significant, however. 
In sum, we find no differences in the susceptibility to resource variation 
across the distribution of student characteristics. These results do not quite 
concur with the conclusions in elsewhere in the literature.
14 
 
14 However, had we examined the issue using conventional interaction terms rather than allowing 
variation in all coefficients across groups we would have concluded that, e.g., children with less-
educated parents are affected to a greater extent. The estimate on the interaction term is 7.5 with 
a t-ratio of 5.9. But the estimates on the interaction terms prove to be rather sensitive to reason-
able variations of the specifications. Therefore, we focus on the specifications where we allow all 
coefficients to vary across groups.  
Table 3 DD estimates of teacher density on ninth grade GPA, by individual characteristics 












born          
ln(teacher  density)  8.70 5.22 5.69 6.41 7.05 7.28 
  (3.61) (3.89) (3.78) (3.26) (3.14) (7.41) 
n  98,024 102,847 77,322 123,549  184,409 16,462 
Notes: The regressions are based on pooled individual data on ninth grade GPA in 1991/92 and 2000/01. GPA is in percentile ranks. The model 
controls for individual variables and municipality variables. The individual variables are: gender, age at compulsory school completion and its square, 
whether the individual was foreign born, whether the individual immigrated within the last five years, whether both parents are foreign born, whether 
there is at least one parent with high school education, and whether there is at least one parent with a college education. The municipality variables 
are: the fraction of females, the average age at compulsory school completion, the fraction of foreign-born, the fraction who have immigrated in the 
preceding five years, the fraction with two foreign-born parents, the fraction of students with at least one high-school educated parent, the fraction 
of students with at least one college educated parent, the log of the average income in the municipality, the log of average school size, the log of the 
number of pupils in the municipality, and the log of the (geographical) size of the area. Academic parents means that at least one parent have 
attended college.  The observations are weighted with the average number of compulsory school completers in the municipality in 1991 and 2000. 
Standard errors adjusted for clustering (municipality) are in parantheses.   
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Table 4 addresses the remaining question: Are the results robust to using test 
scores rather than grades? The extension to test scores is important as it is a 
direct measure of student performance. The grade point average, on the other 
hand, is also affected by teachers’ subjective evaluations. 
The results presented in Table 4 are based on scores from the military 
enlistment tests, where the population is restricted to men who completed com-
pulsory school in 1992 and 2001. The military enlistment test is conducted at 
age 18. The purpose of the test is to measure general ability and it is similar to 
the US AFQT (Armed Forces Qualifications Test). The Swedish military 
enlistment test contains four domains: inductive ability, verbal skills, spatial 
ability, and technical comprehension.
15 It is well-known that the results on tests 
such as these depend on schooling (e.g. Neal and Johnson, 1996) and, hence, 
we can use them as outcome measures. The drawback of these data is that they 
pertain to men only. Notice, however, that the estimates using the grade point 
average as the outcome variable are lower for males than for females as was 
shown in Table 3. 
Table 4 has the same basic structure as Table 2; in other words, the specifi-
cations become increasingly flexible as we move from left to right. The basic 
difference-in-differences estimate – obtained by controlling for individual and 
municipality characteristics – is reported in column (3). This estimate is actu-
ally higher than the corresponding estimate in Table 2. 
Again, more flexible specifications produce virtually identical results, in 
particular the results are robust for controlling for the previous trend in test 
scores. Test scores thus increase by 11 percentile ranks in response to a change 
in teacher density by 100 log-points. These results are even stronger than the 
ones presented previously and, hence, they support our earlier conclusion.
 
15 The design of the Swedish military enlistment battery is described more fully in Carlstedt and 
Mårdberg (1993).  
Table 4 OLS and DD estimates of teacher density on military enlistment test scores, men 
   
Model  OLS DD DD DD DD DD          
ln(teacher  density)  -4.67 12.83 11.12 11.24 10.13 11.28 
  (2.13) (4.35) (3.31) (3.32) (3.62) (3.67) 
Control  variables:        
Municipality fixed effects    X  X  X  X  X 
Reform fixed effect     X  X  X  X  X 
Individual  variables      X X X X 
Municipality  variables      X X X X 
Share of non-certified teachers       X     
Individual variables×reform          X  X 
Municipality variables×reform         X  X 
Test score trend×reform            X 
n  76,837 76,837 76,837 76,837 76,837 76,837 
Notes: The regressions are based on pooled individual data on military enlistment test scores for men who completed compulsory school in 1991/92 
and 2000/01. The test scores are in percentile ranks. The individual variables are: whether both parents are foreign born, whether there is at least one 
parent with high school education, and whether there is at least one parent with a college education. The municipality variables are: the fraction of 
females, the average age at compulsory school completion, the fraction of foreign-born, the fraction who have immigrated in the preceding five 
years, the fraction with two foreign-born parents, the fraction of students with at least one high-school educated parent, the fraction of students with 
at least one college educated parent, the log of the average income in the municipality, the log of average school size, the log of the number of pupils 
in the municipality, and the log of the (geographical) size of the area. The test score trend is the linear time trend coefficient from separate 
municipality regressions of military enrollment test scores for men who completed compulsory school in 1981-90. The observations are weighted 
with the average number of compulsory school completers in the municipality in 1991 and 2000. Standard errors adjusted for clustering 
(municipality) are in parantheses.   The estimate of 11 percentile ranks when using test scores as the outcome 
measure should be compared to the estimate for men using grades as the out-
come measure (5.2 ranks). If we believe that test scores capture the variation in 
student performance more adequately, this comparison thus suggests that the 
estimates based on grades may be biased downwards (by a factor of 2). If we 
take this estimate and relate it to the class-size variation in STAR, we get that a 
class-size reduction corresponding to STAR would increase the performance of 
boys by 5.5 percentile ranks (or 0.17 SD) which is in the same ballpark as the 
estimates in Krueger (1999). 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper we have presented new evidence on the impact of resources on 
student achievement. The evidence we have offered relies on a policy experi-
ment implemented in Sweden in the beginning of the 1990s. This reform 
decentralized authority over compulsory schools to the municipalities and sub-
sequently abolished ear-marked central government money for schools. In 
response to this reform the distribution of resource inputs over municipalities 
shifted rather drastically. 
Using the resource change induced by the reform as the source of identi-
fying variation, we consistently find that increases in the teacher/pupil ratio 
improve student achievement. The effect sizes are somewhat smaller than in 
the Tennessee STAR experiment analyzed by Krueger (1999) and the previous 
analysis of Swedish data by Lindahl (2005). For the average student we find 
that student performance increases by 0.08 standard deviations in response to 
increases in teacher density equivalent to the class-size reduction in STAR. 
This should be compared to the effect-size of 0.2 standard deviations reported 
by Krueger (1999). It seems, however, that part of the reason for the smaller 
estimates of the magnitudes involved is the fact that we are primarily measur-
ing student outcomes by grade point averages rather than test scores. In a sen-
sitivity analysis we have shown that the impact on test scores for boys are 
about twice as large as the impact on the grade point average of boys. 
The teacher/pupil ratio fell throughout the 1990s in Sweden. Our estimates 
thus suggest that student performance deteriorated as a result. An interesting 
question is whether the resource development during the 1990s feed on labor 
market outcomes such as employment and wages. Since it is too early to 
observe these outcomes we leave this question for future research. 
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Table A1 Means (standard deviations), 1991/92 and 2000/01 school years  () y    
  Year 1991/92  Year 2000/01 
    
Dependent variables    
Ninth grade GPA  50.06  49.93 
  (28.85) (28.82) 
Military enlistment test score (men)  50.04  50.11 
  (28.91) (28.77) 
School resource variable    
ln(teacher density)  2.20  2.01 
  (0.08) (0.07) 
Individual variables    
Female 0.49  0.49
Age at compulsory school completion 16.03  16.01 
  (0.21) (0.26) 
Foreign born  0.07  0.09 
Immigrated within the last five years  0.02  0.01 
Both parents are foreign born  0.06  0.05 
Parents with high school education  0.47  0.48 
Parents with college education  0.35  0.42 
Municipality variables    
ln(average income)  4.86  5.20 
  (0.09) (0.12) 
ln(average school size)  5.29  5.43 
  (0.29) (0.32) 
ln(number of pupils)  8.54  8.72 
  (1.07) (1.13) 
ln(geographical size of the area)  6.44  6.44 
  (1.20) (1.20) 
Test score trend 1981-90  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.34) (0.34) 
n 97,945  102,92
 
6 
Notes: Ninth grade GPA and military enlistment test scores are in percentile ranks. The military 
enlistment test scores refer to men only, and the number of observations are 42,480 in 1990/91 
and 34,357 in 2000/01. The observations are weighted with the average number of compulsory 
school completers in the municipality in 1991 and 2000. A few observations with missing values 
on parents’ origin and/or parents’ education have been placed in the reference category. The test 
score trend is the linear time trend coefficient from separate municipality regressions of military 
enrollment test scores for men who completed compulsory school in 1981-90. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses.   
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